Abstract. We consider the reconstruction of shared secrets in communication networks, which are modelled by graphs whose components are subject to possible failure. The reconstruction probability can be approximated using minimal cuts, if the failure probabilities of vertices and edges are close to zero. Minimal cuts are also used to design another heuristic for the near-optimal placement of secrets sets on the vertices of the graph.
Introduction
We consider a scenario where a set of secrets is shared among individuals connected by a communication network, in such a way that no individual holds all the secrets. In other words, several individuals have to cooperate in order to reconstruct the whole secret set.
Secret sharing schemes were first introduced and investigated in [2] and [9] . In an (m, k)-threshold scheme, a secret is divided into k shares in such a way that the secret can be reconstructed whenever at least m of the shares have been collected. Survey papers on secret sharing schemes and threshold schemes are [11] and [12] .
In this paper, we always assume m = k, i. e. it is necessary to collect all of the shares in order to reconstruct the secret. Subsets of the set of all secrets (called shares) are stored in the nodes of a communication network whose nodes and links are subject to failure with certain probability. One vertex is assumed to be the user node. We consider two main problems:
-to calculate the reconstruction probability of the secrets, given an assignment of shares to vertices, -to assign shares to vertices such that the reconstruction probability of secrets gets as large as possible.
Papers closely related are [5] and [6] . In Sections 3 and 4 of this paper, we present an approximation algorithm for the determination of the reconstruction probability as well as a heuristic for the near optimal placement of secret sets.
The model and previous results
In this paper, a communication network is modelled by a finite undirected graph G = (V, E), where V consists n vertices, and E is the set of edges. Let a finite set S = {s 1 , s 2 , ..., s k } of secrets be given, and let S be a set of nonempty subsets (shares) of S. One node v U ∈ V is supposed to be the user node. A shared secret scheme or secret sharing scheme on G is a 1-1 mapping σ : S → V \ {v U }, i. e. Figure 1 each of the selected shares is placed on some node of the graph other than the user node.
It is further assumed that the vertices and the edges of G may possibly fail, i.e. they work with a certain probability only, and that the states of all single vertices and edges are independent from each other. In this paper, this probability is assumed to equal a fixed p(0 ≤ p ≤ 1) for all vertices and all edges. The only exception is the user node v U ; for technical reasons which will become clear later, it is assumed that v U always works. The reconstruction probability of (G, S, σ) is the probability that the complete secret set S can be reconstructed by the user node, i. e. the probability that along paths using vertices and edges not having failed and starting from node v U , it is possible to collect all the secrets s 1 , s 2 , ..., s k . It is obvious that as a function of p, the reconstruction probability is a polynomial. We denote this polynomial by r(p). More formally, we call any subset X ⊆ V ∪ E a state. A state X is operational if the secrets can be reconstructed provided each element of X works. In these terms, the reconstruction probability is the probability that the vertices and vertices not having failed constitute an operational state.
At this point, we have to mention that other models of secret sharing schemes in graphs have also been intensively investigated, see e. g. [3] .
Returning to our model, one problem is to determine the polynomial r(p). It can also be of interest to merely find the value r(p 0 ) for a given p 0 . Given the graph G, set S of shares and probability value p 0 for all vertices and edges, another problem is to design a shared secret scheme (i.e. placement of shares on the vertices) such that r(p 0 ) becomes maximum. Figure 1 shows a graph consisting of eight vertices and twelve edges. As in all the examples of this paper, the node labelled "1" is the user node. Four secrets s 1 , s 2 , s 3, s 4 are given, and S consists of the following six secret sets:
Example 1. The diagram in
shared secret scheme (i. e. placement of shares on vertices) is also shown in the diagram. The reconstruction probability polynomial turns out to be: the graph reliability problem. For the basic results in this field, we refer to [4, 10] ; a lattice-theoretic approach described in [1] and [13] is the basis of [6] .
In [5] , r(p) is calculated by constructing minimal share spanning trees. Also, a simple share assignment algorithm is presented providing near-optimal share assignments efficiently. In this algorithm, the main strategy is to place large secret sets on vertices close to v U .
Example 2. For the same graph G 1 as in Example 1, consider the share assignment shown in Figure 2 . The two-element secret sets are placed on the neighbours of node 1. Surprisingly, this scheme is slightly less reliable than the one we considered in Example 1. (An explanation for this will be given in the next paragraphs.) In particular, r(p) = Cuts play a central role in the rest of this paper, in particular cuts which are inclusion-minimal (mincuts). The dual approach based on inclusion-minimal operational sets (sometimes called minpaths) is used in [5] . For a survey on the roles of cuts and paths in network reliability, see [4] .
As usual, a subset C of V ∪ E is called a cut if (V ∪ E) \ C is not operational, i.e. failure of all the elements of C makes it impossible for v U to reconstruct the complete secret set. A cut C is a mincut if it is inclusion minimal as a cut, i.e. no proper subset of C is a cut.
For s ∈ S, call a subset C of V ∪ E an s-separator if failure of the elements of C makes it impossible for v U to collect s. In this terminology, a cut is a subset which is an s-separator for some s ∈ S. In [8] , an algorithm is described generating all minimal s-separators.
To illustrate the notion of cuts, we look at the following example which is also considered in [5] .
Example 3. Figure 3 shows a graph G 2 consisting of eight vertices and eleven edges. As in the preceding examples, four secrets s 1 , s 2 , s 3, s 4 are given, and S consists of the following six shares: S 1 = {s 1 } , S 2 = {s 2 } , S 3 = {s 3 } , S 4 = {s 4 } , S 5 = {s 1 , s 3 } , S 6 = {s 2 , s 4 } . A shared secret scheme is also shown in the diagram, with reconstruction polynomial r(p) = 3p 5 (This example was also presented in [7] ).
Example 4. Consider the shared secret scheme for the graph G 2 in Figure 4 . The reconstruction polynomial turns out to be r(p) = 3p 5 , with r(0.9) = 0.9398. There are 5 two-element mincuts, 20 three-element mincuts, 32 four-element mincuts, 28 five-element mincuts, and only few larger ones.
Using mincuts for approximations
The following obvious fact is the basis of our approximation to r(p): Remark 1. A state X ⊆ V ∪ E is not operational if and only if its complement contains at least one mincut, i.e. there is a mincut C ⊆ (V ∪ E) \ X.
In other words, this means 1 − r(p) equals the probability that all the elements of at least one mincut fail. Applying the inclusion-exclusion principle, this leads to a well-known formula which we rephrase as follows:
.., C t } be the collection of all the mincuts of a shared secret scheme. Then
Proof. Let f i represent the statement "C i fails" (i.e. each of its elements fails). Then by the above observation, we get:
By inclusion-exclusion, this leads to:
prob(f i and f j ) + |{i,j,k}|=3 prob(f i and f j and f k ) − ... Using independence of the states of single elements, one finally gets the formula of the theorem.
If we now set r s (p) = 1 − 1≤j≤s (−1)
|∪ i∈T Ci| for 1 ≤ s ≤ t, then obviously, r 1 (p), r 2 (p), ..., r t (p) is a sequence of approximations to r(p), with r t (p) = r(p). To be more precise, 
At this point, it is certainly plausible that if p 0 is close to 1.0, then r(p 0 ) tends to strongly depend on the number of mincuts of small cardinality.
As usual, we define q := 1 − p.
For the following examples, let M denote the set of mincuts with two or three elements. As approximation r app (p) to r(p) we define r app (p) :
where the following notation is used : m 2 is the number of two-element mincuts in M, m 3 is the number of three-element mincuts in M, u 3 is the number of unions of two elements of M that contain three elements, and u 4 is the number of unions of two elements of M consisting of four elements. Table 1 gives an overview on the secret sharing schemes considered in the above examples. As can be seen, for these graphs of modest size, r app (0.9) is quite a good approximation to the reconstruction probability, r(0.9). Once the relevance of mincuts for the reconstruction probability has become clear, we now turn to the question what makes a shared secret scheme have few mincuts. It turns out that, basically, there are two different effects that make a set X of vertices and edges a cut:
-failure of X disconnects the graph, and the whole secret set cannot be reconstructed by v U only visiting vertices in its connected component (graph cut) -X contains all vertices that carry one specific secret (secret cut) To illustrate this, let us look at the example of Figure 3 again. X = {3, 4} is a cut, since failure of the two vertices 3 and 4 disconnects the graph, and the whole secret set cannot be reconstructed by v U visiting only vertices in its connected component. Observe that Y = {6, 7} is not a cut, although it disconnects the graph. On the other hand, Z = {2, 4} does not disconnect the graph, but nevertheless is a cut, since none of the remaining vertices carries secret s 1 .
It is now possible to identify the reason why the shared secret scheme of Figure  4 has fewer two-element mincuts than the scheme shown in Figure 3 : In the scheme shown in Figure 4 , {3, 4} is a mincut "for two reasons", namely it is a graph mincut, but it also constitutes a mincut since it contains all vertices carrying secret s 2 ; opposed to this, the example of Figure 3 has the "additional" mincut {3, 5} .
From these observations, we conclude that when designing a shared secret scheme, it is advantageous to place "secret mincuts" on vertex mincuts of the graph. The following example, however, demonstrates this is not an optimal strategy in all cases. Consider the shared secret scheme shown in Figure 5 , with secret set S = {s 1 , s 2 } and shares S 1 = {s 1 } , S 2 = {s 2 }. Obviously, in this case, the one-element "secret mincuts" {2} and {3} dominate reconstruction probability; in fact, it turns out that r(0.9) ≈ 0.81. Hence, in this case, it would be unnecessary work to analyze the vertex mincuts.
We are now ready to present our heuristic for share assignment. The heuristic is only based on vertex mincuts of the underlying graph.
A few more definitions and notations are needed. For a graph G = (V, E), κ(G) denotes the minimum cardinality of a vertex mincut, i. e. the minimum number of vertices whose removal results in a disconnected or trivial graph. It is well-known that by constructing maximal flows, κ(G) can be determined in polynomial time.
For a collection S of non-empty subsets of S = {s 1 , s 2 , ..., s k }, let S i := {T ∈ S | s i ∈ T } and λ(S) := min {|S i | | 1 ≤ i ≤ k} .
Now assume a graph G = (V, E) and set of shares, S ⊆ P(S), are given, with v U ∈ V the user vertex, |V | = n, and |S| = k. Our heuristic for share assignment is polynomial in the size of the graph, if λ(S) is fixed; it uses two different algorithms, a Basic Algorithm and a Mincut Algorithm, which are applied depending on the relation between κ(G) and λ(S) :
I)
If λ(S) < κ(G), use the Basic Algorithm.
II)
If λ(S) ≥ κ(G), use the Mincut Algorithm. The idea is the following: If the graph is highly connected (in relation to λ(S)), as is the case in the example of Figure 5 , one should simply place large secret sets
